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Abstract
In 2006, Hwang et al. presented a forgery attack against Tseng et al.’s eﬃcient authenticated encryption schemes
with message linkages for message ﬂows. Moreover, they proposed some modiﬁed schemes to repair these ﬂaws. In
this paper, we show that the improved authenticated encryption schemes proposed by Hwang et al. are insecure by
presenting another attack that allows a dishonest referee, dealing with a dispute, to decrypt all the future and past
authenticated ciphertext between the contending parties. This attack proves that Hwang et al.’s schemes contradict the
forward and backward conﬁdentiality requirements of authenticated encryption schemes.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Typical authenticated encryption schemes guarantee conﬁdentiality, authenticity (unforgeability) and
non-repudiation properties [1, 2]. Several authenticated encryption schemes have been proposed in the
literature to achieve theses three essential requirements. Nyberg and Rueppel [1, 3] proposed the ﬁrst au-
thenticated encryption scheme with message recovery. To improve upon the communication and computa-
tion complexities of the original Nyberg and Rueppel scheme, several variants of authenticated encryption
schemes have been proposed. For example, the schemes in [3, 4, 5] achieve these requirements, but they
are costly in terms of their communications and computations overhead. On the other hand, schemes that
simultaneously combine the authenticity and the conﬁdentiality operations are more eﬃcient [6]. For more
details regarding eﬃcient authenticated encryption schemes and their advantages and disadvantages, we re-
fer the reader to [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Tseng et al. [6] proposed an eﬃcient authenticated encryption scheme and its generalization, both with
message linkages. The ﬁrst scheme is a basic one that requires the recipient (veriﬁer) to wait until she re-
ceives all of the signature blocks before she can recover any of the received message blocks. The second
scheme is a generalized one that allows the recipient to recover the message blocks upon receiving their
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corresponding signature blocks. This makes it an attractive choice in many applications such as packet
switched networks. Unfortunately, Hwang et al. [14] showed that these authenticated encryption schemes
do not fulﬁll claims to their integrity and authenticity properties. To overcome these security problems,
Hwang et al. proposed a modiﬁcation of these schemes [14].
In this paper, we show that the modiﬁed schemes proposed by Hwang et al. do not overcome the short-
comings of the original Tseng et al. scheme. In particular, we present an attack that allows the referee,
dealing with a dispute, to decrypt all the authenticated traﬃc between the signer and the designated recipi-
ent of the authenticated ciphertext.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy review the details of
Hwang et al.’s schemes that are relevant to our attack. Our proposed attack is presented in section 3. Finally
we oﬀer concluding comments in section 4.
2. Hwang et al. improved authenticated encryption schemes
In this section, we brieﬂy review the relevant details of the authenticated encryption schemes proposed
by Hwang et al. For further details about these schemes, the reader is referred to [14].
Similar to Tseng et al. [6], the improved schemes proposed by Hwang et al. consist of three phases: the
system initialization phase, the signing phase, and the message recovery phase. Here, we focus only on the
basic scheme but our attack equally applies to the generalized scheme.
System Initialization Phase: The system authority (SA) selects a large prime p such that p − 1 has a
large prime factor q. SA also picks an integer, g, with order q in GF(p). Let f (·) be a secure one-way hash
function. The SA publishes p, q, g, and f (·). Each user, Ui, chooses a secret key xi ∈ Z∗q and computes the
corresponding public key yi = gxi mod p.
To overcome the weaknesses in Tseng et al.’s scheme, Hwang et al. require the signer Ua to send
t = gk mod p in addition to s, and r1, r2, . . . , rn to the veriﬁer Ub. Hwang et al.’s scheme then proceeds as
follows:
The Signing Phase: When the signer Ua wants to send the authenticated encrypted message M to a des-
ignated recipient Ub, she divides the message M into the sequence {M1, M2, · · · , Mn}, where Mi ∈ GF(p).
Then, the signer Ua performs the following operations to generate the signature blocks for the message M:
(1) Pick a random number k ∈ Z∗q and set r0 = 0, then compute ykb mod p and t = gk mod p.
(2) Compute
ri = Mi · f (ri−1 ⊕ ykb) mod p (1)
for i = 1, . . . , n, where ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or operator.
(3) Compute
s = k − r · xa mod q (2)
where r = f (r1||r2|| · · · ||rn), and || denotes the concatenation operator.
Finally, Ua sends (n + 2) signature blocks (t, s, r1, r2, . . . , rn) to Ub over the insecure channel.
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The Message Recovery Phase: After the designated recipient Ub receives all the signature blocks
(t, s, r1, r2, . . . , rn), she performs the following operations on them to recover the message blocks {M1, M2, · · · , Mn}.
(1) Compute
r′ = f (r1||r2|| · · · ||rn) (3)
Then, check whether txb ?= ysb y
r
′
ab mod p holds, where yab = y
xb
a mod p. If txb = ysb y
r
′
ab mod p holds, then
Ub moves to the second step.
(2) Recover the message blocks {M1, M2, · · · , Mn} as
Mi = ri · f (ri−1 ⊕ txb)−1 mod p (4)
for i = 1, . . . , n and r0 = 0.
3. The proposed attack
In this section we introduce our attack on Hwang et al.’s schemes. Our attack shows that, when mediat-
ing a dispute, the involved third party (referee) can decrypt all future and past traﬃc between the contended
parties. Consider the case where a veriﬁer, Ub, wants to convince a third party (referee) that she is the
designated recipient of the signature blocks that originated from the signer (encrypter) Ua.
In other words, Ub wants to achieve the property of non-repudiation. So, she reveals txb to the referee.
Then Ub proves (e.g. using zero-knowledge protocol [15]) to the referee that the discrete logarithm of
txb · y−sb mod p to the base yra mod p equals the discrete logarithm of yb mod p to the base g. The correctness
of this step follows by noting that.
logyra t
xb · y−sb mod p = loggxa ·r gk·xb · g−xb(k−r·xa) mod p
= loggxa ·r g
xb·k−xb·k+xb·r·xa mod p
= loggr·xa g
r·xa·xb mod p
= xb,
(5)
logg yb mod p = logg g
xb mod p
= xb.
(6)
Also, the referee can calculate r
′
= f (r1||r2|| · · · ||rn), and veriﬁes that r′ = r.
Knowing both txb mod p and the signature blocks, (t, s, r1, r2, . . . , rn), the referee is able to calculate
yab mod p as follows:
First, she raises yb to s and re-orders the exponents and bases as in the following equation:
ysb = y
k−r·xa
b mod p
= ykb · y−rab mod p,
(7)
By noting that,
ykb mod p = t
xb mod p. (8)
then, she drives yrab as:
yrab mod p = t
xb · y−sb mod p (9)
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Finally, she calculates yab as follows:
yab = (t
xb · y−sb )r
−1
mod p (10)
Later, the referee can intercept the traﬃc between Ua and Ub. Hence, she can decrypt the signature
blocks as follows:
(1) Assume that the new signature blocks are (t
′
, s
′
, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
n), where t
′
= gk
′
mod p. The attacker (i.e.,
the dishonest former referee) calculates r
′
= f (r
′
1||r
′
2|| · · · ||r
′
n) then calculates (t
′
)xb mod p as follows:
(t
′
)xb = ys
′
b · yr
′
ab mod p (11)
(2) The attacker recovers the message blocks {M′1, M
′
2, · · · , M
′
n} as
M
′
i = r
′
i · f (r
′
i−1 ⊕ (t
′
)xb)−1 mod p (12)
for i = 1, . . . , n and r
′
0 = 0.
The attack is correctly carried out as follows:
First, the new signature is:
s
′
= k
′ − r′ · xa mod q (13)
Moreover,
(t
′
)xb = gk
′ ·xb mod p
= yk
′
b mod p
(14)
Using Equation (13),
ys
′
b · yr
′
ab mod p = g
s
′ ·xb · gr′ ·xa·xb mod p
= gxb(k
′ −r′ ·xa) · gr′ ·xa·xb mod p
= gxb·k
′ −r′ ·xa·xb · gr′ ·xa·xb mod p
= gxb·k
′
mod p
= yk
′
b mod p
(15)
As demonstrated above, targeting the non-repudiation property allows the referee to decipher the cipher-
text between Ua and Ub. The same attack can apply to the generalized from of Hwang et al.’s scheme.
4. Conclusion
The improved authenticated encryption schemes proposed by Hwang et al. fail to simultaneously satisfy
both the conﬁdentiality and the non-repudiation properties. In particular, as illustrated by our attack, dis-
honest arbitrator is able to decrypt all future, as well as past, communications between contending parties.
Further research is needed to improve upon the security features of both of these schemes.
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